HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

WEDNESDAY ,THE SIXTH DAY OF JULY

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY TWO

PRSENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A V SESHA SAI

THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE V.SUJATHA

WRIT PETITION NO: 10516 OF 2005

Between:

1. M.A. MAJEED FormerlySub-Inspector of Police nandyal-III Town, R/o Nandyal, Kurnool District

...PETITIONER(S)

AND:

1. STATE OFA.P., REPB PRINCIPAL SECY & 2 OTHERS Home (SC-A) Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad
2. The Deputy Inspector of General of Police, Kurnool Range, Kurnool District
3. The Superintendent ofPolice, Kurnool, Kurnool District

...RESPONDENTS

Counsel for the Petitioner(s): LAKSHMIKANTH REDDY DESAI

Counsel for the Respondents: GP FOR SERVICES I

The Court made the following: ORDER

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI
AND
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE V.SUJATHA

WRIT PETITION No.10516 OF 2005

ORDER: (*Per Hon'ble Sri Justice A.V.Sesha Sai*)

Applicant in Original Application No.8572 of 2001 on the file of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter called, 'the Tribunal') is the petitioner in the present Writ Petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner herein filed the said Original Application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, assailing G.O.Ms.No.45 Home (SC-A) Department dated 24.02.2001, issued by the State Government and the consequential proceedings dated 24.03.2001 of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Kurnool. By way of G.O.Ms.No.45 Home (SC-A) Department dated 24.02.2001, the State Government dismissed the petitioner from service and the Deputy Inspector General of Police issued the consequential order dated 24.03.2001. The said orders came to be issued as a consequence of the report dated 24.04.2000 submitted by the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings in Tribunal Enquiry Case No.21 of 1998.

2. The Tribunal, vide order dated 02.05.2003, dismissed the Original Application, confirming the orders of punishment of dismissal and in the present Writ Petition, challenge is to the said order.

3. Heard Sri Lakshmikanth Reddy Desai, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri N.Ashwatha Narayana, learned Government

Pleader for Services-I, appearing for the respondents, apart from perusing the material available on record.

4. Submissions/contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner:

(1) The order passed by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal is highly erroneous, contrary to law and not in consonance with the material available on record, besides being opposed to the very spirit and object of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991.

(2) No independent appreciation of the material available on record was undertaken either by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal or by the Disciplinary Authority.

(3) The involvement of the petitioner could not be proved before the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings beyond reasonable doubt and the Tribunal arrived at the conclusions without any foundation and basis and without assigning any valid reasons.

(4) Having regard to the contradictions in the evidence of the witnesses examined before the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings thoroughly went wrong in recording the findings against the petitioner.

(5) The Department could not prove by adducing cogent and convincing reasons, the demand and acceptance by the petitioner, which are essential elements and the condition precedent for imposing the penalty.

In support of his submissions and contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner takes the support of the Division Bench judgment of

the composite High Court of A.P. in the case of ***Abdul Lateef v Government of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its Principal Secretary, Agriculture and Co-operation Dept. and another***[1].

5. Contentions/submissions of learned Government Pleader:-

(1) Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Disciplinary Authority is perfectly justified in inflicting the penalty of dismissal from service and there is no error in the findings of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings and, in the absence of any procedural infirmity or jurisdictional error, invocation of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner is impermissible.

(2) The petitioner herein cannot request this Court to undertake re-appreciation of factual aspects and any such request is impermissible under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

(3) The Department proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and the evidence on record clinchingly proves the involvement of the petitioner in the case.

To bolster his submissions and contentions, learned Government Pleader places reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of ***State of A.P. and others v. S.Sree Rama Rao***[2] and ***Bank of India and another v. Degala Suryanarayana***[3].

6. In the above background, now, the issue that emerges for consideration of this Court is:-

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[1] 2005 (2) ALT 762 (DB)
[2] AIR 1963 SC 1723
[3] (1999)5 SCC 762

"Whether the orders passed by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, confirming the orders of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings and the orders of the Disciplinary Authority, are sustainable and tenable or whether the same warrant any interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?"

7. The information available before this Court reveals that pursuant to a trap conducted by ACB against the petitioner, who was working as Sub Inspector of Police, III Town Police Station, Nandyal, on a complaint made by one Mr. T.Krishna Mohan, saying that the petitioner demanded money for not registering case against one Mr. T.Rajasehkar, the State Government, vide proceedings dated 07.04.1998, placed the matter before the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, alleging that the petitioner herein had taken the money and passed on the amount to his brother, one Mr. Mahaboob Basha, a Constable in Nandyal Police Station and that he ran away and absconded on 19.07.1996.

8. The Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, pursuant to the reference made by the State Government framed the following charge:

"That you, Sri M.A.Mazad, while working as Sub Inspector of Police, III Town Police Station, Nandyal, Kurnool District, demanded an illegal gratification of Rs.10,000/- and after bargaining, you agreed to receive Rs.5,000/- on 17.12.1996. You have accepted and received an amount of Rs.5,000/- from the complainant, Sri T.Krishna Mohan, S/o. Maddileti of Nandyal on 19.12.1996 at about 9-40 p.m. to show official favour to the brother of the complainant, by name, Mr. T.Rajasekhar, who involved in an prohibition and excise case registered against him and thereby you are guilty of

misconduct within the meaning of Rule 2(b) of the A.P.Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1989, framed under the A.P.Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Act, 1960, as amended by the A.P.Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Amendment Act, 1993."

9. The Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings commenced the proceedings and in order to substantiate its case, prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 16 and marked Exs.P.1 to P.16 and M.Os.1 to 7 and on defence side, D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.D.1 to D.6 were marked. The Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, vide report dated 24.04.2000, found the Charged Officer guilty of the charge.

10. Pursuant to the said report, the State Government, vide memo dated 29.05.2000, issued a show cause notice, enclosing the report of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings and called upon the petitioner under the A.P.Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1991, to file representation. In response to the same, the petitioner herein submitted a representation in writing on 30.08.2000. After receipt of the said representation, the State Government inflicted on the petitioner the punishment of dismissal from service, vide G.O.Ms.No.45, Home (SC-A) Department dated 24.02.2001. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Kurnool Range, Kurnool, issued a consequential order on 24.03.2001. Thereafter, the issue landed before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal in O.A.No.8572 of 2002 and the Tribunal, vide order dated 02.05.2003, dismissed the Original Application.

11. In order to adjudicate the issues in the present Writ Petition, it would be highly essential and apposite for this Court to verify and analyse the material available on record in a meticulous manner.

12. P.W.1 is one Sri T.Krishna Mohan, on whose complaint, the Disciplinary Proceedings were initiated by the respondents herein. According to his evidence in chief, he met the petitioner on 30.11.1996 at 7-00 a.m. in III Town Police Station, Nandyal, but the petitioner asked him to meet in his residence in the evening and that when P.W.1 met the petitioner in the evening, the petitioner told P.W.1 that the brother of P.W.1 got involved in a case along with one Mr. Nazir Ahmed and that the petitioner was going to register a case and P.W.1 should pay Rs.10,000/- for not registering a case against P.W.2. P.W.1 also deposed that the Charged Officer telephoned him on 17.12.1996 and threatened to involve in the case. In this context, it is significant to note that Crime No.121 of 1996 was already registered against P.W.2 (brother of P.W.1) on 29.11.l996 for the offences punishable under the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act. Coming to the cross-examination of P.W.1 — He deposed contrary to what he said in the chief-examination and stated that he went to III Town Police Station, Nandyal at about 10-00 a.m. and that the petitioner herein was not available in the Police Station, Nandyal. P.W.1 also categorically deposed during the course of cross-examination that he never met the petitioner on 30.11.1996 and further clarified that during the period from 29.11.1996 to 19.12.1996, he never met either the Circle Inspector of Police or

Deputy Superintendent of Police, Nandyal. It is also important and significant to note that during the course of cross-examination, P.W.1 also stated, in clear and categoric terms, that he did not lodge Ex.P.1-complaint before the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB, which is the basis for the entire case of the prosecution. It is also important to note that P.W.1 also deposed in the cross-examination that the tainted notes were handed over to him and he himself kept the same in his pant pocket and that when he met the petitioner, the petitioner had shaken his hands with P.W.1 and P.W.1 also stated that on 19.12.1996, the petitioner did not demand any amount nor accepted any amount as bribe.

13. Coming to the evidence of P.W.2 — He stated that he did not know Mr. Mohammed Basha, to whom the petitioner was alleged to have given the money, and that he was seeing him for the first time. He further deposed that he had no personal knowledge about the demand of Rs.10,000/-. P.Ws.3 to 7, examined by the prosecution before the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, turned hostile. P.Ws.11 and 12 did not state anything with regard to the recovery of the amount. On the other hand, P.W.11, during the course of cross-examination, stated that after searching the house of the Charged Officer for tainted currency notes and when they were not found, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB did not search the persons of P.Ws.1 and 2. P.W.11 further deposed that he does not know whether the chemical and liquid found on M.O.6 and the liquid found on M.O.5 turned colourless. P.W.13, Additional Superintendent of Police, Kadapa, deposed that he did not place any material before the Court

to substantiate that his subordinates caused enquiry on Ex.P.1-complaint and that he did not personally verify the antecedents of P.Ws.1 and 2. He also deposed that except the circumstantial evidence, there is no material evidence available on record to show that the Charged Officer No.2 had received Rs.5,000/- tainted amount from the Charged Officer.

14. Admittedly, P.W.14 is an interested witness and having regard to the evidence of the other witnesses, it would not be safe to place reliance on the version of the said interested witness, while discarding the evidence of other witnesses available on record. Rest of the witnesses also did not depose anything with regard to the demand and acceptance and recovery of the amount.

15. The Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, in view of the above reasons, grossly erred in treating the evidence let in on behalf of the Department as sufficient for holding the charge as proved. In the considered opinion of this Court, the evidence adduced by the Department before the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings is liable to be regarded as tenuous, feeble and weak and it is not safe to place reliance on such weak evidence to inflict the major punishment of dismissal from service. The contradictions pointed out above are sufficient to discard the case of the Department. Neither the demand nor the acceptance could be proved by the Department by adducing independent evidence. It is also required to be noted that no recovery could be affected, which cuts the very root of the matter.

16. Coming to the order of punishment passed by the State Government — This Court notices that after submission of report by the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, the State Government issued a show cause notice, enclosing a copy of the report of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings and called upon the petitioner to submit explanation/representation under Rule 21(4) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991. In response to the same, the petitioner herein submitted an elaborate and extensive explanation/representation, highlighting various issues, which would impact the root of the matter. But except indicating the said explanation/representation as one of the references in the order of punishment, the Disciplinary Authority did not consider the contents of the said explanation/representation submitted by the petitioner. Having issued a show cause notice and having acknowledged the explanation/representation submitted by the petitioner, this Court does not find any justification on the part of the Disciplinary Authority in not considering various issues raised by the petitioner, while passing the order of punishment. This exercise undertaken by the Disciplinary Authority is highly arbitrary, unreasonable, illegal and cannot be approved.

17. The Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, except concurring with the view expressed by the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, did not examine the issues from proper perspective, as such, the order of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal also does not deserve approval. In view of these reasons, the contentions advanced by the learned Government Pleader are liable to be rejected

and are accordingly rejected. It is also not safe to conclude against the petitioner simply on the ground that his fingers turned pink on examination in the absence of recovery of tainted currency notes and in view of the categoric deposition of P.W.1-complainant during the course of cross-examination that he had shaken his hands with the petitioner after the said notes were handed over to P.W.1 and putting the same in his own pant pocket.

18. It is also significant to note that by way of a common order, the Tribunal dismissed O.A.No.8572 of 2001 (filed by the petitioner herein) and O.A.No.2549 of 2002 (filed by M.Mahaboob Basha, Charged Officer No.2). Against the order passed by the Tribunal, Charged Officer No.2, viz., M.Mahaboob Basha had approached this Court by way of filing W.P.No.10517 of 2005 and this Court, vide order dated 23.07.2020, allowed the said Writ Petition, holding that in the absence of evidence, the findings recorded by the Tribunal (Charged Officer No.2) against the presence of the petitioner in the said Writ Petition on the date of trap, by any stretch of imagination, cannot be sustained.

19. Coming to the judgment cited by the learned counsel, in ***Abdul Lateef'***s case (first cited supra), a Division Bench of the composite High Court of A.P., while dealing with a case, which arose under the A.P.Civil Services Disciplinary proceedings Tribunal Rules, 1989, at paragraphs.20 and 21, held as follows:

> 20. Since there is a serious doubt about the demand and acceptance, the benefit of doubt ought to have been given

to the petitioner as held by one of us (GBJ) in K.Abdul Gafoor v. High Court of A.P., Further it is also curious to note that the Government had also not taken any steps to prosecute the petitioner obviously for the reason that there is no evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, this Court is aware that the non-prosecution of the petitioner in a criminal case cannot prohibit the Government from proceeding departmentally. But, even in the departmental enquiry, they have to establish the guilt of the accused in case of misconduct which is quasi criminal in nature, if not beyond reasonable doubt, but beyond preponderance of probabilities. That is also lacking in this case.

21. We have referred to the statement of the petitioner before the Tribunal, not for the purpose of re-appreciating the evidence, but to satisfy ourselves whether the appreciation was according to law and whether the finding suffers from perversity when tested on the basis of intellect of a man of ordinary prudence. When the complainant had stated in the cross-examination that the petitioner had insisted for payment of arrears due and that he assured the payment of instalment as bribe. On the basis of this statement we find that no person of ordinary prudence would conclude that the petitioner had demanded bribe. Thus, we find that the finding recorded by the Disciplinary Tribunal suffers from patent illegality and infirmity. The approach of the Tribunal appears to have proceeded with the enquiry with preconceived notion only to find the accused guilty of the charge without taking into consideration the relevant evidence of the complainant. The Presiding Officer obviously did not sit with an open mind to hold an impartial disciplinary enquiry which is essential component of principles of natural justice as also reasonable opportunity

contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Under those circumstances, we are satisfied that the finding of the Tribunal that the charge had been proved is wholly unsustainable. The Administrative Tribunal had not discussed this issue and observing that the enquiry was properly conducted and refused to interfere with the finding and thus dismissed the application.

20. Coming to the judgment cited by the learned Government Pleader in ***State of A.P. and others v. S.Sree Rama Rao*** (second cited supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph 7 held as follows:

"7.There is no warrant for the view expressed by the High Court that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, must be applied, and if that rule be not applied, the High Court in a petition under Art, 226 of the Constitution is competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: iris concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent Officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High

> Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution".

21. In the case of ***Bank of India and another v. Degala Suryanarayana*** (third cited supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 11 and 14 held as follows:

> "11. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings. The Court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with

the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of malafides or perversity i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that findings. The Court cannot embark upon re-appreciating the evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained, in Union of India v. H.C.Gael, [1964] 4 SCR 718 the Constitution Bench has held :-

> "the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not."

14. However, the matter as to promotion stands on a different footing and the judgments of the High Court have to be sustained. The sealed cover procedure is now a well established concept in service jurisprudence. The procedure is adopted when an employee is due for promotion, increment etc. but disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending against him and hence the findings as to his entitlement to the service benefit of promotion, increment etc. are kept in a sealed cover to be opened after the proceedings in question are over (see Union of India etc. etc. v. K.V. Jankiraman etc.etc, AIR (1991) SC 2010, 2113. As on 1.1.1986 the only proceedings pending against the respondent were the criminal proceedings which ended into acquittal of the respondent wiping out with retrospective effect the adverse

> consequences, if any, flowing from the pendency thereof. The departmental enquiry proceedings were initiated with the delivery of the charge-sheet on 03.12.1991. In the year 1986-87 when the respondent became due for promotion and when the promotion committee held its proceedings, mere were no departmental enquiry proceedings pending against the respondent. The sealed cover procedure could not have been resorted to nor could the promotion in the year 1986-87 withheld for the D.E. proceedings initiated at the fag end of the year 1991. The High Court was therefore right in directing the promotion to be given effect to which the respondent was found entitled as on 01.01.1986. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the order of punishment made in the year 1995 cannot deprive the respondent of the benefit of the promotion earned on 01.01.1986.....

22. The State of Andhra Pradesh enacted the legislation called A.P.Civil Services (Disciplinary proceedings Tribunal) Act, 1960, to provide for the constitution of Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings to enquire into the allegations of misconduct on the part of the Government Servants and for other matters connected therewith. In exercise of the powers conferred under the said Act, the Government of A.P., framed the Rules called A.P.Civil Services (Disciplinary proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1989. According to Clause (d) of Rule 6 of the said Rules, the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings shall as far as possible observe the basic rules of evidence, relating to the examination of witnesses and the marking of documents and the enquiry shall conform to the principles of natural justice. Clause (j) of Rule 6 of the Rules specifically mandates that the proceedings of the Tribunal shall contain sufficient record of the evidence.

23. Coming to the instant case, P.W.1-complainant and P.W.2-brother of the complainant totally denied the case of the prosecution, during the course of cross-examination, but the Tribunal, without assigning any reasons, muchless valid reasons, brushed aside the said evidence. P.W.13, who is superior officer to P.W.1, also stated that Ex.P.14 nowhere reflects the vantage position or member of raid party. Since the members of the raid party did not take position anywhere in the entire topography of Ex.P14 sketch, in the considered opinion of this Court, the instant case is a case of total lack of evidence and the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings recorded the findings on mere assumptions and presumptions. Therefore, this Court has absolutely no hesitation to hold that the findings recorded by the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings suffer from patent illegality and infirmity.

24. In view of the above reasons, the judgment sought to be pressed into service by the learned Government Pleader, in support of his submissions and contentions, in the considered opinion of this Court, would not render any assistance to the case of the respondents herein. In fact, the Hon'ble Apex Court, as mentioned supra, in the case of ***State of A.P. and others v. S.Sree Rama Rao*** (second cited supra), categorically found that the High Court may undoubtedly interfere when the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or; where the conclusion on the very face of

it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. It is also significant to note that in the case of ***Bank of India and another v. Degala Suryanarayana*** (third cited supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court ruled that the Court exercising the jurisdiction of the judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of malafides or perversity i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that findings.

25. For the aforesaid reasons, this Writ Petition is allowed, setting aside the orders of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal in O.A.No.8572 of 2002 dated 02.05.2003 and the orders of punishment passed by the State Government, vide G.O.Ms.No.45 Home (SC-A) Department dated 24.02.2001, concurring with the views expressed by the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings in Tribunal Enquiry Case No.21 of 1998 and the orders of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Kurnool, dated 24.03.2001 and consequently, the respondents are directed to extend the petitioner all the consequential benefits, including seniority, periodical promotions and pay all the back wages to the petitioner. This entire exercise shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any, pending in this Writ Petition, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs of the Writ Petition.

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A.V.SESHA SAI, J

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V.SUJATHA, J

Date: 06.07.2022
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THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI
AND
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE V.SUJATHA

WRIT PETITION No.10516 OF 2005

Date: 06.07.2022

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