The Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court found no reason to doubt Ms. Nair’s report and decided not to interfere. However, the Court observed that High Courts should respect people's sexual orientation and identity without trying to undermine or alter them through therapy or other measures. The Constitution protects the rights and dignity of members of the LGBTQ+ community and courts must respect the autonomy of such individuals. The judgement of the Court was authored by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud.The Supreme Court also established guidelines emphasising the importance of prioritising habeas corpus petitions, ensuring privacy, safety, and non-discrimination, promptly releasing detained individuals, and providing immediate police protection. These guidelines are for courts handling cases where the police or family members attempt to intervene with personal relationships that individuals have freely chosen.

The Supreme Court set aside the result of the election as declared by the Presiding Officer, as it found that the eight invalid votes were, in truth, valid. Invoking its extraordinary power to do justice under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court declared the Appellant, Kuldeep Kumar, as the validly elected Mayor of the Chandigarh Municipal Corporation.Furthermore, the Court directed that a show cause notice be issued to the Presiding Officer as to why proceedings under Section 340 of the Criminal Code of Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) should not be instituted against him for making a false statement before the Court. Section 340 of the CrPC allows for a preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether any offence affecting administration of justice has been committed in respect of a document produced in court or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.

The Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the Appellants and set aside the chargesheet and criminal proceedings against them. The Court held that in this case there was no evidence of entrustment; the property was not handed over in trust, rather, there was a sale. Therefore, there could be no question of a breach of trust under Section 406 IPC. Additionally, there was no material to show intent to cause alarm, necessary for an offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC, even if the allegations against the Appellants were to be accepted.The Court further elaborated on the necessary contents of a chargesheet, stating that it is considered complete when it includes sufficient material and evidence for the Court to take cognizance and proceed to trial. The Court further stressed the importance of chargesheets containing detailed facts of the offence and the relevant evidence, as mandated by Section 173(2) of the CrPC.

 A Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, based on the report submitted by the Medical Board, granted admission to the Appellant in the MBBS course. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Viswanathan.The Supreme Court held that the role of Disability Assessment Boards is not to merely quantify the disability of a candidate but to assess whether they can pursue the course in question. In this regard, the following directions were issued: (i) Disability Assessment Boards must positively record whether the disability would impede the candidate's ability to complete the course. If the Board concludes that a candidate is ineligible, it must provide reasons for its decision; (ii) Pending the creation of an appellate body, the decisions of the Disability Assessment Boards will be subject to judicial review. The courts should refer such cases to any premier medical institute for an independent opinion and decide accordingly.

A Division Bench (Two-Judges) of the Supreme Court held that Mr. Kejriwal should be released on interim bail till 1 June 2024 on certain terms and conditions. First, he will have to surrender to the investigation authorities on 2 June 2024; second, he must furnish bail bonds to the sum of Rs. 50,000; third, he shall not be allowed to visit the Office of the Chief Minister and the Delhi Secretariat; fourth, he shall not sign official files unless it is required and necessary for obtaining approval of the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi; fifth, that he shall not make any comment with regard to his role in the present case; and sixth, he shall not interact with any of the witnesses or have access to any official files connected with the case.

The Supreme Court found that the authorities did not possess any material to question the nationality of the Appellant. It recognised the Appellant as an Indian citizen. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Amanullah.

A Division Bench (Two Judges) of the Supreme Court held that the Appellant’s arrest and remand into police custody were invalid because the grounds for arrest were not communicated in writing before the remand. As charges had now been framed against the Appellant, the Appellant was ordered to be released from custody after furnishing bail as required by the trial court. The judgement of the Court was authored by Justice Sandeep Mehta.

The Supreme Court set-up a nine-member National Task Force to create a national protocol for the safety of doctors and medical professionals around the country. The Task Force was required to formulate effective recommendations to address concerns pertaining to safety, working conditions and well-being of medical professionals and other cognate matters. The Task Force’s action plan may be categorized under two heads (I) Preventing violence, including gender-based violence against medical professionals; and (II) Providing an enforceable national protocol for the dignified and safe working conditions for interns, residents, senior residents, doctors, nurses and all medical professionals.The Supreme Court also ordered the CBI to submit a status report by 22 August 2024 on the progress in the investigation. The State of West Bengal was also informed to file a status report by 22 August 2024 on the progress of the investigation on the acts of vandalism which took place at the Hospital in the aftermath of the incident.

A Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court authored two separate opinions. Both Judges agreed that Mr. Kejriwal should be granted bail. Justice Kant held that the arrest of Mr. Kejriwal when he was in judicial custody in the ED case was not illegal. However, Justice Bhuyan found the CBI’s arrest of Mr. Kejriwal unjustified.Mr. Kejriwal’s bail was made subject to the conditions imposed on him when granting him bail in the ED Case. These conditions were that he would not visit his office or the Delhi Secretariat and he shall not sign official files unless it is required for obtaining approval of the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi.

The Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court granted bail to the Appellant subject to certain conditions including that he would mark his presence twice a week in the office of Deputy Director, ED in Chennai and he would surrender his passport to the PMLA Court. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Oka.

The Supreme Court quashed the FIR registered against the appellant under Section 153-A IPC. The Court held that the right to dissent against government decisions in a legitimate and lawful manner is an integral part of the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Oka.

The Division Bench (Two-Judges) of the Supreme Court granted interim bail to Mr. Kejriwal while referring the legal questions concerning the validity of his arrest to a larger bench. The larger bench will address the issues related to the need and necessity for arrest under Section 19 of the PMLA. Mr. Kejriwal’s interim bail was subject to the following conditions: (i) furnishing a bail bond worth Rs.50,000 with surety; (ii) not visiting his office or signing official documents without approval; (iii) refraining from commenting on the case; and (iv) avoiding contact with witnesses or access to related official files. The judgment was authored by Justice Khanna.

The Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the Appellant to be released on bail. The bail was granted subject to the following conditions: (i) furnishing bail bonds for a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- with two sureties of the like amount; (ii) surrendering passport with the Special Court; (iii) regular reporting to investigation officers; and (iv) the Appellant must not attempt to influence the witnesses or tamper with the evidence. The judgement was authored by Justice Gavai.

A Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and upheld the constitutional validity of the Madarsa Act except the provisions which provided for the regulation of higher education degrees. These provisions were found to conflict with the UGC Act. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.

The Supreme Court held that in this case it is not in the best interest of the child to allow the DNA test because the ultimate object for demanding DNA test is not for determining parentage of the child but for proving allegations of adultery (extramarital relations) during the marriage, which can be proved by adducing any other evidence. The Court also held that children have the right not to have their legitimacy questioned frivolously before a court of law. This is an essential attribute of their right to privacy. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice B.V. Nagarathna and signed by Justice V. Ramasubramanian. Justice V. Ramasubramanian also wrote a separate concurring opinion.

The Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court rejected the Petitioner’s demand for a complete return to paper ballots or for 100% counting of VVPAT slips. The Court acknowledged the Petitioner’s concerns regarding the transparency and reliability of EVMs but emphasised that the current system, which made the VVPAT slip visible to the voter for seven seconds before being deposited in a sealed box, provides an adequate method for verifying votes. The Court also issued directions to ensure further improvements in the electoral process to enhance voter confidence and the integrity of elections. Justice Khanna authored an opinion, and Justice Datta also wrote a concurring opinion.

A Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the challenged Prison Manual provisions were unconstitutional and violated the following articles of the Constitution: Article 14 (equality), Article 15 (prohibition of caste discrimination), Article 17 (abolition of untouchability), Article 21 (life and liberty), and Article 23 (forced labour). The Court ordered the States to revise their prison manuals within three months. It also asked for a status report from the states. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.

The Three-Judge-Bench of the Supreme Court allowed the petition and held that the Governor cannot withhold action indefinitely on bills which have been passed by the State Legislature. The Court also ruled that the Speaker can reconvene a session of the Legislative Assembly which has not been prorogued. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.

The Division Bench (two judges) held that SBCs cannot charge enrolment fees beyond the fees set out in Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act and charging of such exorbitant fees is violative of right to equality under Article 14 and right to practise any profession under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The Court held that SBCs and Bar Council of India cannot demand additional payment of fees other than the enrolment fees and stamp duty set out in the Advocates Act. The Court pronounced its judgment with prospective effect, clarifying that SBCs are not required to refund excess enrolment fees collected from the applicants before the date of judgment. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.

The Constitution Bench unanimously held that an automatic expiration of interim orders after a period of six months is impermissible. Further, the Court held that issuing blanket directions that the High Courts should hear all cases where interim stays are operating on a daily basis and decide them within a stipulated time frame was beyond the powers of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Oka, while Justice Mithal wrote a separate concurring opinion.

The Division bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court found the accused guilty of the offence of rape under Section 376(3) and 376(2)(n) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. However, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s acquittal of the accused on the charges of kidnapping and abduction under the IPC. The judgement was authored by Justice Oka.The Supreme Court observed that consensual relationships cannot be an exception to the POCSO Act, and the High Courts cannot use their discretionary powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash prosecutions in such cases where the guilt of the accused is confirmed, even if a settlement is reached between the accused and the victim.The Supreme Court directed the State Government to constitute a committee consisting of a clinical psychologist and a social scientist to assess the victim’s situation and help her arrive at an informed decision. The Supreme Court directed the Secretaries of all States and Union Territories to ensure compliance with the POCSO Act and laws related to the welfare of minors.

The Supreme Court held that the power of courts to interfere with the regulatory functions of SEBI is limited. The Court did not find any valid grounds to cancel the amendments made to SEBI Regulations. The Court held that there was no apparent failure in regulation by SEBI and hence there was no need to transfer the investigation to an SIT. The Court directed the Union Government and SEBI to consider the suggestions made by the expert committee to strengthen the regulatory framework. The judgment of the court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.

The Supreme Court quashed the detention order and directed for the release of the detenu. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Datta.The Supreme Court also laid down the following guidelines for courts to follow when reviewing preventive detention orders:The authority must consider all relevant circumstances and not rely on extraneous material.The power of preventive detention must be exercised for the intended purpose and not for unauthorised reasons.The detaining authority must act independently and not under external influence.The authority should not disable itself from considering individual cases.The satisfaction must be based on material that demonstrably satisfies statutory mandates.There should be a clear link between past conduct and the need for detention, without relying on stale material.The grounds for detention must be relevant and be shared with the detenu, allowing for representation.The detention process must adhere strictly to the timelines provided by the relevant law.

The Supreme Court refused to grant bail to the Appellant in light of the serious allegations in the chargesheet filed by the ED regarding the offences under the PMLA that the Court found were tentatively supported by evidence. However, the Court unequivocally stated that the Court found all disputed factual and legal issues were left open and will be decided in trial before the Trial Court. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Khanna.The Supreme Court gave the Appellant the freedom to file a fresh bail application in case there was a change in circumstances or if the trial proceeded slowly over the next three months. The Court also allowed the Appellant to file interim bail applications in case of any medical or personal or family emergency.

The Supreme Court held that the LG is not bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers of the Delhi Government when nominating members to the MCD under Section 3(3)(b)(i) of the MCD Act. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Narasimha.

The Supreme Court held that the BCI has the power to prescribe a post-enrolment examination like the All India Bar Examination as a necessary condition to practice as an advocate. The Court held that the BCI also has the power to prescribe a pre-enrolment examination or necessary pre-enrolment training as a condition for practicing as an advocate. The Court declared that the decision in V. Sudeer was incorrect. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Sanjay K. Kaul.

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court declined to refer the correctness of Nagraj to a Seven-Judge-Bench. The Court held that the declaration in Nagraj that quantifiable data should be collected for the purposes of determining backwardness and inadequacy of representation of SC and ST classes is contrary to the Nine-Judge-Bench decision in Indra Sawhney and hence incorrect. The Court also ruled that the doctrine of ‘creamy layer’ is applicable to reservations for SCs and STs and courts could themselves exclude the creamy layer from reservations. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Nariman.

 The Supreme Court held that the Speaker must recognise the whip and leader of the legislature party as appointed by the concerned political party. In the event of a split, the Speaker can decide if MLAs of any faction ought to be disqualified and the Election Commission can decide who can use the party’s symbol. Both these decisions can be taken concurrently and neither the Speaker nor the Election Commission needs to wait for the other’s decision.The Supreme Court held that except in extraordinary cases, neither the High Courts nor the Supreme Court can decide disqualification proceedings under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. The Court further held that an MLA had the right to participate in legislative proceedings while disqualification petitions are pending against them and the validity of decisions taken by the legislature cannot be questioned merely because disqualification petitions were pending against certain members.The Supreme Court ruled that a Governor is only justified in calling a person to prove their majority on the floor of the legislature if the Governor has reasons to believe, based on objective material, that such a person has lost the confidence of the majority of the legislature.On the issue of whether the Speaker can decide disqualification proceedings when a notice for the Speaker’s removal is pending, the correctness of the decision in Nabam Rebia was referred to a larger Bench of seven judges. Until the issue is decided by seven judges, the Court held that the Speaker has the authority to examine whether a motion for their removal was genuine or merely intended to stop them adjudicating disqualification proceedings. If the Speaker found the removal motion to be genuine, then they could pause the disqualification proceedings till the decision on the Speaker’s removal was concluded. Else, the Speaker could reject the motion. The judgment of the Court was unanimous and authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.

The Supreme Court held that the Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner before the Supreme Court under Article 32 was maintainable. Because the Petitioner-victim’s Writ Petition was held to be maintainable, the Court did not answer the question on whether PIL petitions can be filed by other citizens to challenge remission orders. The Court found that the Government of Gujarat was not competent to pass the remission applications in favour of the convicted-Respondents. Therefore, the Supreme Court quashed the orders granting remission to the eleven convicts as illegal. The Supreme Court observed that the order in the Radheshyam Shah case directing the Government of Gujarat to consider the remission application was legally invalid because it was obtained by fraud. The judgment of the Court was unanimous and was authored by Justice Nagarathna.The eleven released convicts were directed to report back to concerned jail authorities within two weeks.

The Constitution Bench (five judges) wrote four opinions. All five Judges found that there is no fundamental right to marry under the Constitution. All five Judges further held that the Special Marriage Act, 1954 allows marriage only between a male and a female and cannot be interpreted to cover non-hetrosexual marriages as this would amount to an extensive re-writing of the law beyond the role of the Court. However, the Court did not strike down the SMA as unconstitutional.A majority of three judges (Chief Justice Chandrachud, Justice Bhat, and Justice Kohli) expressly stated that transgender persons in heterosexual relationships as well as Intersex persons who identify as either male or female have the right to marry under existing law.By a 3:2 majority, the Supreme Court held that non-heterosexual couples do not have the right to enter into a civil union unless the legislature changes the laws. This 3:2 majority further held that unmarried couples (including queer/non-heterosexual couples) do not have the right to jointly adopt a child under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (“JJ Act”). The opinions of Justice Bhat (joined by Justice Kohli) and Justice Narasimha formed the majority opinion of the Court on these issues.The minority found that non-hetrosexual couples have a right to enter into a civil union. The minority found that a failure to recognise civil unions would violate Article 15 of the Constitution. The minority further interpreted Section 57 of the JJ Act to allow unmarried couples to adopt and consequently struck down Regulation 5(3) of the Central Adoption Resource Authority (“CARA”) Adoption Regulation, which limits adoption only to single individuals and married couples who are in a stable marital relationship. The opinions of Justice Chandrachud and Justice Kaul constituted the minority opinion of the Court.The Supreme Court acknowledged that members of the LGBTQIA+ community faced a variety of legal disadvantages and directed the Union Government to constitute a committee chaired by the Union Cabinet Secretary to set out the rights and benefits queer couples in civil unions would be entitled to.

The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Amendments to the DPSE and Vigilance Act. However, the Court ruled that the second and third extensions of Mr. Mishra’s tenure on 17 November 2021 and 17 November 2022 were illegal and in violation of the Supreme Court’s Common Cause decision. The Court directed the Union Government to appoint a new Director for the Enforcement Directorate by 31 July 2023, while Mr. Mishra continues in the role until then. The Three-Judge Bench judgment was authored by Justice B.R. Gavai.

The Supreme Court held that MIB’s order revoking MBL’s permission for uplinking and downlinking Media One was unconstitutional. The judgement of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.The Supreme Court held that MBL’s right to a fair hearing has been infringed because: (i) MIB’s order revoking Media One’s license did not contain any reasons for denial of security clearance and (ii) the Union’s reasons were not disclosed to MBL and were only disclosed to the Court. The Supreme Court further held that the non-renewal of permission to operate a media channel is a restriction on the freedom of the press which can only be reasonably restricted on the grounds stipulated in Article 19(2) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that Media One’s alleged anti-establishment stance and the alleged link of the shareholders of the channel to JEI-H are not legitimate reasons to restrict the right of freedom of speech. The Court directed MIB to proceed with the issuing of renewal permissions in accordance with the Court’s judgment within four weeks.

A Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court held that the PwD Act 1995 mandates reservation in promotions for persons with disabilities, and the Respondent was entitled to the claimed promotions with retrospective effect. The Court directed the State of Kerala to implement the judgment of the Supreme Court in the cases of Rajeev Kumar Gupta v Union of India (2016 INSC 482) and Siddaraju v State of Karnataka (2020 INSC 36) within three months to provide for reservation in promotion in all identified posts. In these cases, the Supreme Court had ruled that three percent reservation must be provided to PwDs including in promotions.

A Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court held that the PwD Act 1995 mandates reservation in promotions for persons with disabilities, and the Respondent was entitled to the claimed promotions with retrospective effect. The Court directed the State of Kerala to implement the judgment of the Supreme Court in the cases of Rajeev Kumar Gupta v Union of India (2016 INSC 482) and Siddaraju v State of Karnataka (2020 INSC 36) within three months to provide for reservation in promotion in all identified posts. In these cases, the Supreme Court had ruled that three percent reservation must be provided to PwDs including in promotions.

The Supreme Court held that that arbitration agreement or arbitration clause contained in an unstamped or inadequately stamped contract is valid and can be acted upon. The Court also held that a contract which is not stamped or is inadequately stamped is not void but is only inadmissible in evidence. The Court declared that the decisions in N N Global 2 and SMS Tea Estates were incorrect. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud. Justice Sanjiv Khanna wrote a separate concurring opinion.

The Supreme Court directed the Union Government to ensure phased eradication of manual sewer cleaning, by developing policies and issuing directives to all relevant bodies, including corporations, railways, cantonments, and agencies under its jurisdiction. Additionally, it should provide essential guidelines to ensure that outsourced sewer cleaning tasks do not necessitate individuals entering sewers for any reason.State Governments were directed to align their policies with Union guidelines, providing comprehensive rehabilitation measures for sewage workers and their families. The Court highlighted the need for a significant increase in compensation for sewer deaths and disabilities, alongside mechanisms for contractor accountability. The compensation amount for sewer deaths was raised to thirty lakhs. Additionally, the Court instructed the establishment of educational scholarships for victims' dependents and the coordination of legal authorities in policy implementation. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Bhat.

The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the Group of Companies Doctrine in Indian arbitration law, ruling that companies within a corporate group, even if not explicit signatories to an arbitration agreement, could be bound by the agreement. Regarding exactly when non-signatories may be bound, the Court ruled that such determinations should be left to the competence of arbitral tribunals on a case-to-case basis. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, with Justice P. S. Narasimha authoring a concurring opinion.

The Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, while emphasizing the critical importance of proactively protecting Great Indian Bustards, overturned the earlier interim order dated 19 April 2021. The Court held that there are no valid grounds for a blanket prohibition on solar power transmission lines across a 99,000 square kilometer area, as converting all lines to underground poses technical challenges. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.Recognising the complex interplay between biodiversity conservation and climate change mitigation, the Supreme Court highlighted the need for a balanced approach.The Court constituted an expert committee, which was given a broad mandate, including assessing the feasibility of underground lines and effectiveness of bird diverters, and was directed to submit its report by July 31, 2024.

The Supreme Court unanimously held that legislators are not entitled to immunity under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) of the Constitution of India for engaging in acts of bribery. This Seven Judge Bench overturned the judgment in P.V. Narasimha Rao.The Supreme Court established a dual criterion for determining when lawmakers could be granted immunity under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) of Constitution: first, immunity applied when the activity pertained to a collective function of the legislature, and secondly, the action in question must be inherently linked to the fulfilment of the duty of a legislator. The judgment was authored by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud.

The Constitution Bench (five judges) of the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that there is no conflict between the judgments in the Prem Nath Kaul and the Sampat Prakash. The Court therefore declined to refer the issue to a larger bench. The Court also held that the case of Sampat Prakash was not incorrect because it failed to consider the earlier decision in Prem Nath Kaul. This decision paved the way for the legality of abolition of Article 370 to be decided by a Constitution Bench (five judges) as opposed to a larger bench of seven judges.

The Constitution Bench (five judges) of the Supreme Court referred the question of whether the Finance Act, 2017 qualifies as a money bill to a larger bench of seven judges. The Court struck down the Tribunal Rules framed by the Union Government as unconstitutional because the Rules interfered with the independence of the tribunal members. Chief Justice Gogoi authored the majority opinion on behalf of himself, Justice Ramana and Justice Khanna. Justice Chandrachud and Justice Gupta wrote separate, partly dissenting, partly concurring opinions.The Supreme Court also recommended the Union Government frame new rules ensuring uniform and non discriminatory conditions of service for tribunal members. The majority held that Section 184 of the Finance Act has adequate guiding principles to inform the creation of new rules and thus did not constitute excessive delegation of legislative powers to the Union Government.In their separate dissenting opinions, both Justice Chandrachud and Justice Gupta held that defining the qualifications and terms of service of the members of a tribunal is at the heart of a tribunal’s functioning. They held that these conditions must be laid down by Parliament and cannot be delegated to the Union Government who is often one of the parties before the tribunal.Justice Chandrachud also directed the government to establish a National Tribunal Commission and establish an All India Tribunal Service for the selection of non adjudicatory personnel in tribunals.

 The Supreme Court rejected the petitions and upheld the abolition of Article 370 and the reorganisation of the State of J&K into two Union Territories. The Judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud. Justice Sanjay K. Kaul and Justice Sanjiv Khanna wrote separate concurring opinions. The Supreme Court found that Article 370 was a “temporary” provision enacted until the special circumstances facing J&K were resolved. The Court held the President could not use a Constitutional Order to indirectly amend the Constitution to make the removal of Article 370 conditional on the recommendation of the State Legislature instead of the J&K Constituent Assembly. But it also found that the “recommendation” of the J&K Constituent Assembly under Article 370(3) would never have been binding on the President of India, who always had the power to remove Article 370. After the dissolution of the J&K Constituent Assembly, the President could abolish Article 370 whenever the President thought appropriate. The Court also held that the passage of the J&K Reorganisation Act did not violate the procedure for the reorganisation of States in Article 3. The Government of India stated that the Union Territory of J&K would be made a State again, and thus the Court did not decide the legality of converting the State of J&K into two Union Territories. The Court directed that elections to the Legislative Assembly for the Union Territory of J&K be held by 30 September 2024.

Having regard to the plain language and future perfect tense "shall have the same rights," the only conclusion is that the daughters who are included in the coparcenary will have the same rights after coming into force of the Amendment Act. The future perfect tense indicates that an action will have been completed (finished or perfected) at some point in the future. This tense is formed with "will" plus "have" plus the past participle of the verb. If the Parliament had intended to mean as conferring the same rights in the coparcenary, anterior to the amendment, the language would have been different. The future perfect tense indicates that action will have to be completed at some point in time in the future. The tense is formed with “will” plus "have" plus the past participle of the verb. If the Parliament intended to mean conferring the same rights in the coparcenary, anterior to the amendment, the language would have been different. If the daughter is now made a coparcener, she would now have the same rights as she is a son.

The Constitution Bench (five judges) unanimously upheld the correctness of the law laid down in Mukund Dewangan and decided that a person holding an LMV license was entitled to drive a transport vehicle weighing less than 7,500 kgs without any additional endorsement on their license. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Roy.

The Supreme Court held that the Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 and the amendments made by the Finance Act to Section 29C of the RP Act, Section 182(3) of the Companies Act and Section 13A(b) of IT Act are unconstitutional. The Court also held the deletion of the proviso to Section 182(1) of the Companies Act permitting unlimited corporate contributions to political parties even for loss making companies is arbitrary and violative of Article 14. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice (Dr.) Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud. Justice Sanjiv Khanna wrote a concurring but separate opinion.The Supreme Court also directed that SBI shall submit to the ECI by 6 March 2024: (i) details of the Electoral Bonds purchased from 12 April 2019 till date, to the Election Commission of India (“ECI”). The details shall include the date of purchase of each Bond, the name of the purchaser and the denomination of the Bond purchased; and (ii) details of political parties which have encashed Electoral Bonds since 12 April 2019 to date to the ECI including details of each Electoral Bond encashed by political parties, the date of encashment and the denomination of the Electoral Bond.The Court directed the ECI to publish the information shared by SBI on its official website within one week from the receipt of the information (by 13 March 2024).

The Seven Judge Bench of the Supreme Court found Justice Karnan guilty of contempt, sentenced him to six months imprisonment, and held that his allegations against various judges and the judiciary in general were malicious and defamatory. The Court held that the conduct of Justice Karnan constituted criminal contempt, which both scandalised the court and interfered with the administration of justice.The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Khehar. Justice Chelameswar wrote a separate concurring judgment for himself and Justice Gogoi.

The Supreme Court unanimously held that its decision in the 2018 Joseph Shine case did not consider whether the invalidation of Section 497 of the IPC applied to the Army Act, Air Force Act or Navy Act that governed the armed forces. Thus, the striking down of adultery under the IPC did not affect proceedings against members of the armed forces under the Army Act, Air Force Act or Navy Act. Justice Joseph authored the judgment of the Court.

The Supreme Court allowed the petition and held that live streaming of court proceedings should be introduced as a pilot project for cases of constitutional and national importance being heard by the Chief Justice of India. The Court found that live streaming would be an extension of the principle of open courts and access to justice, which will serve diverse stakeholders and the public at large. Justice Khanwilkar authored the majority opinion on behalf of himself and Chief Justice Misra, while Justice Chandrachud authored a separate concurring opinion.The Supreme Court issued model guidelines for live streaming of court proceedings, initially to be implemented at the Supreme Court. The guidelines aimed to balance the principle of open courts with the dignity of court proceedings and the privacy interests of litigants and witnesses.Justice Chandrachud recommended the adoption of live streaming in High Courts and district courts in a phased manner based on the available resources and technical support. The Chief Justices of the High Courts were advised to frame appropriate rules for this purpose, taking into account the model guidelines suggested by the Supreme Court.

 The Constitution Bench (five judges) of the Supreme Court unanimously struck down Section 497 of IPC as unconstitutional because it violated the principles of equality, gender discrimination, and personal autonomy under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court also held that Section 198(2) of the CrPC was unconstitutional when read with Section 497 of the IPC. Chief Justice Misra authored a plurality opinion (on behalf of Justice Khanwilkar and himself), while Justice Nariman, Justice Chandrachud, and Justice Malhotra wrote separate but concurring opinions.

The Supreme Court held that the GNCTD had legislative and executive power over the “services” under Entry 41 of List II of the Schedule VII of the Constitution. Thus, in cases regarding civil services and the power to supervise or exercise control over the transfer or suspension of civil servants, the Lt. Governor of NCT of Delhi would be bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers of the GNCTD. However, because Article 239AA confers the Union Government with exclusive legislative power over public order, police, and land in Delhi, the Court held that the Union Government shall exercise power over civil services relating to these specific areas of governance. The decision of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.

We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. (supra), and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammed (supra). Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle in Taylor v. Taylor (1876) 1 Ch.D 426, which has been followed in a number of the judgments of this Court, can also be applied. Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if lead in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65B(4) otiose.

A Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court unanimously held that the act of lynching is unlawful. No individual has the authority to enforce the law and punish fellow citizens by their own hands. The Court held that it is the task of the law to provide a procedure for arrest, investigation, and trial. The State is obligated to ensure the protection of the fundamental rights and liberties of every individual, regardless of their race, caste, class, or religion. The State is also responsible for promoting a secular, inclusive, and diverse societal framework. Further, the Court issued guidelines to curb the menace of vigilantism. However, the Court did not address the constitutional validity of the immunity provisions in the statutes challenged. The judgment was authored by Chief Justice Misra.

The Constitution Bench held that Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act was unconstitutional as the State Legislature of Chhattisgarh lacked the legislative competence to create an appeal directly to the Supreme Court from the order of the Rent Control Tribunal. The Court held that a State Legislature could not enact any law affecting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, only the Parliament could exercise such power. Further, it was held that Presidential assent cannot validate a law that the state legislature never had the power to make. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Banerjee.

The Supreme Court found that the grounds enumerated in Article 19(2) for restricting the right to free speech were exhaustive, and that free speech cannot be restricted for reasons not found in Article 19(2). The Court held that Articles 19 and 21 could be enforced against non-State actors (e.g., other citizens or private companies). It also found that the State has an affirmative duty to protect a person’s rights under Article 21, even against non-State actors.The Court held that a statement made by a Minister about State affairs, could not be attributed to the Government. It also held that a mere statement by a Minister which undermined the fundamental rights of a person or citizen would not be actionable unless it led to an act or omission of public officers that caused harm or loss to the person or citizen. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Ramasubramanian. Justice Nagarathna wrote a separate opinion which dissented on certain issues.The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court directed that the petition from Uttar Pradesh and the appeal from Kerala be listed before regular benches of the Court to be decided in accordance with the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench.

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, by a majority of 4:1, held that the policy of demonetisation and the Demonetisation Notification were legally and constitutionally valid. Justice Gavai authored the majority judgment on behalf of himself and Justices Nazeer, Bopanna and Ramasubramanian. Justice Nagarathna authored a dissenting minority opinion.The Supreme Court held that the Union Government had the power under Section 26(2) of the RBI Act to declare ‘all’ series of bank notes invalid and this included the power to invalidate all series of a denomination of notes. The majority further held that interpreting the provision in this manner does not excessively delegate power to the Government as the power can only be exercised on the recommendation of the RBI’s Central Board. The majority held that the Demonetisation Notification: (i) was not based on a flawed decision making process; (ii) was proportional; and (iii) the time period for exchange of notes was reasonable.The dissenting opinion by Justice Nagarathna held that only the Central Board of the RBI could recommend demonetisation of “any” (and not “all”) series of bank notes under Section 26(2) of the RBI Act. The Union Government could elect to accept such recommendation and issue a notification under Section 26(2) to bring it into effect. In Justice Nagarathna’s view, the Union Government could only demonetise “any” or “all” series of bank notes without the recommendation of the Central Board of the RBI by passing a law in Parliament.

The Supreme Court held that Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 2017 permitting Jallikattu is not contrary to the Supreme Court’s judgment in A. Nagaraja. The Court held that the issues with Jallikattu pointed out in A. Nagaraja has been overcome by the State Amendment Acts by minimising the pain and suffering to the animals during the conduct of the sport. The Court further held that Jallikattu is part of the cultural heritage of Tamil Nadu and that the fundamental rights to equality and life cannot be extended to animals. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Aniruddha Bose.

The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the Petitioners and laid down guidelines to constitute a selection committee consisting of the Prime Minister of India, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, and the Chief Justice of India for appointing ECI members until a law is made by the Parliament. The Court concluded that the framers of the Constitution clearly contemplated a law by Parliament under Article 324 and did not intend the executive to exclusively make appointments to the Election Commission. Seven decades have passed and no law has been framed. There is a clear legislative vacuum and continuing appointments to the ECI solely by the executive will have an adverse effect on the fundamental rights of the people and democracy. Hence, the Supreme Court held that it was appropriate for the Court to lay down norms for the appointment of ECI Members which will be effective until Parliament passes a law. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice K.M. Joseph. Justice Ajay Rastogi wrote a concurring but separate opinion.

At this stage, we must immediately say that insofar as the aforesaid multiplicand/multiplier is concerned, it has to be accepted on the basis of income established by the legal representatives of the deceased. Future prospects are to be added to the sum on the percentage basis and “income” means actual income less than the tax paid. The multiplier has already been fixed in Sarla Verma which has been approved in Reshma Kumari with which we concur.

We are of the opinion that if the provisions of Section 41, Cr.PC which authorises the police officer to arrest an accused without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant are scrupulously enforced, the wrong committed by the police officers intentionally or unwittingly would be reversed and the number of cases which come to the Court for grant of anticipatory bail will substantially reduce. We would like to emphasise that the practice of mechanically reproducing in the case diary all or most of the reasons contained in Section 41 Cr.PC for effecting arrest be discouraged and discontinued.

The Constitution Bench held that the Supreme Court can record the settlement between the parties and dissolve the marriage by passing a decree of divorce by mutual consent in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution without being bound by the procedural requirement under the HMA. The Court also held that while exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court can quash and set aside other proceedings between the parties, including criminal proceedings.Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that under Article 142(1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court could grant divorce if a marriage has irretrievably broken down, even if one party opposes the prayer for divorce. Finally, the Court clarified that parties could not approach the Supreme Court directly to dissolve the marriage under Article 142. Rather, parties would have to approach the Family Court as the court of first instance.The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Sanjiv Khanna.

The Constitution Bench (five judges) of the Supreme Court unanimously held that the existing Rules governing eligibility criteria cannot be changed once recruitment begins unless the existing Rules permit it. However, recruitment bodies can devise appropriate procedures or methods of selection during the recruitment process as long as they are transparent, non-discriminatory, and rational. The Court upheld the decision in K. Manjusree. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Misra.

The Supreme Court held that the Central and the State laws which are applicable to the State of Orissa will continue to apply to Scheduled Areas in the State of Orissa unless the Governor, under Clause 5(1) of the Fifth Schedule, declares that a particular law is not applicable to the Scheduled Area. The Supreme Court held that non-tribals have the right to settle down in a Scheduled Area based on Article 19(1)(e) of the Constitution of India which grants every citizen a right to settle in any part of the territory of India. Further, any person including non-tribals have a right to vote even in Scheduled Areas. There is no provision that all the constituencies for Lok Sabha and State Legislature elections in Scheduled Areas are reserved only for Scheduled Tribes candidates. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Oka.

The Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, relying on State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961 INSC 229) (“Kathi Kalu”), held that the prohibition against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution would not be violated if the accused is compelled to provide voice samples. Being compelled to produce purely forensic evidence such as thumb impressions, fingerprints or handwriting is not self-incriminatory, and thus does not violate Article 20(3). Only oral or written testimony based on personal knowledge of the accused is protected from compelled disclosure. The Supreme Court, relying on its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do ‘complete justice’ (including filling in gaps in statutes) held that a judicial magistrate must be granted authority to order a person to give a voice sample. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Gogoi

The evidence relating to electronic record, as noted herein before, being a special provision, the general law on secondary evidence under Section 63 read with Section 65 of the Evidence Act shall yield to the same. Generalia specialibus non derogant, special law will always prevail over the general law. It appears, the court omitted to take note of Sections 59 and 65A dealing with the admissibility of electronic record. Sections 63 and 65 have no application in the case of secondary evidence by way of electronic record; the same is wholly governed by Sections 65A and 65B. To that extent, the statement of law on admissibility of secondary evidence pertaining to electronic record, as stated by this court in Navjot Sandhu case (supra), does not lay down the correct legal position. It requires to be overruled and we do so. An electronic record by way of secondary evidence shall not be admitted in evidence unless the requirements under Section 65B are satisfied.

The Nine-Judge Bench wrote five opinions. All nine judges unanimously upheld the right to privacy as a part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, and a protected right across the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution (Fundamental Rights). The Supreme Court held that privacy is inherent and inseparable from dignified human existence. A majority of judges agreed that an individual's privacy can only be interfered with by a measure based on a law, is necessary to secure a legitimate government interest, and the interference with privacy is proportionate to the government’s objective. Justice Chandrachud authored a plurality opinion on behalf of Chief Justice Khehar, Justice Agrawal, Justice Nazeer, and himself. Justice Chelameswar, Justice Bobde, Justice Nariman, Justice Kaul, and Justice Sapre all authored separate concurring opinions.

The Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the Appellant’s conviction but reduced the sentence for the offence of murder from thirty years without remission, to twenty-five years without remission, including the period already served. The judgement of the Court was authored by Justice Viswanathan.The Supreme Court illustratively laid down the aggravating and mitigating circumstances for determining the minimum sentence (without remission) to be imposed while commuting a death sentence. In the present case, the Court held that the relatively young age of the Appellant when he committed the crime (twenty eight years), the absence of any financial motive, and no attempt to escape from the crime scene, were mitigating factors. The fact that the decision primarily relied on circumstantial evidence and the Appellant had already served more than eighteen years in jail while showcasing positive conduct throughout, further influenced the decision to reduce the sentence.

The Seven-Judge Bench, by a 6:1 majority, held that it was permissible for states to sub-classify SCs when providing reservations. Chief Justice Chandrachud authored a plurality opinion for himself and Justice Misra. Justice Gavai, Justice Mittal, Justice Nath and Justice Sharma each authored separate concurring opinions. Justice Trivedi wrote a dissenting judgment which found sub-classification to be impermissible under the Constitution.

The Supreme Court held that children born out of void or voidable marriages are entitled to a share in their parents' ancestral properties. The Court clarified that such children are not coparceners in the ancestral property (a person who shares equally with others in the inheritance of an undivided property) and cannot claim an equal share in the ancestral property in their own right. However, children from void and voidable marriages are entitled to a right in their parents’ share of the ancestral property. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.

A Constitution Bench (five judges) of the Supreme Court by a majority of 4:1 upheld the constitutional validity of Section 6A. Justice Kant on behalf of himself and Justices Sundresh and Mishra authored the majority opinion and Chief Justice Chandrachud authored a separate concurring opinion. Justice Pardiwala authored a dissenting judgment declaring Section 6A invalid.In response to the contention that Section 6A was not being adequately enforced, the majority issued the following directions:The directions issued in Sarbananda Sonowal v Union of India (2005 INSC 287) should be followed to deport the illegal migrants who entered after 1971.The provisions of the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950 should be integrated with Section 6A for identifying illegal immigrants.The current statutory framework and tribunals for identifying illegal immigrants in Assam are inadequate and must be enhanced to enforce the legislative intent of Section 6A in a time-bound manner.

Justice and justness emanate from equality in treatment, consistency and thoroughness in adjudication, and fairness and uniformity in the decision making process and the decisions. While it may not be possible to have mathematical precision or identical awards, in assessing compensation, same or similar facts should lead to awards in the same range. When the factors/inputs are the same, and the formula/legal principles are the same, consistency and uniformity, and not divergence and freakiness, should be the result of adjudication to arrive at just compensation.

The Nine-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court by an 8:1 majority upheld a State Legislature’s power to regulate industrial alcohol and overruled the judgement in Synthetics. Chief Justice Chandrachud authored the majority opinion on behalf of Justice Roy, Justice Oka, Justice Pardiwala, Justice Misra, Justice Bhuyan, Justice Sharma and Justice Masih while Justice Nagarathna authored a dissenting opinion.The majority held that the expression “intoxicating liquors” under Entry 8 of the State List was inclusive of all kinds of alcohol which are detrimental to health. This includes denatured spirits used as raw materials to produce potable alcohol. Thus, the IDRA must be interpreted as excluding “intoxicating liquors” as interpreted in this judgment. Given the finding that industrial alcohol fell under Entry 8 of the State List, the majority held it was not necessary to decide whether orders under Section 18G of the IDRA excluded states’ power to regulate products under Entry 33 of the Concurrent List.Justice Nagarathna, in her dissenting opinion, held that ‘industrial alcohol’ is distinct from “intoxicating liquors” asserting that while States have the authority to regulate ‘intoxicating liquor’ intended for human consumption, they lack the legislative competence to legislate ‘industrial alcohol’ because of Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule (industries which the Union Government controls in the public interest) and the statutory framework of the IDRA.

The Supreme Court held that the declaration in Subramanian Swamy will have retrospective effect, and Section 6A of DSPE Act will not have legal effect from its date of insertion, i.e. 11 September 2003. The Court ruled that once a law is declared unconstitutional then it would be void ab initio (i.e., treated as not having any legal effect from the day it was enacted). As a result, Section 6A will offer no protection to senior civil servants even if their investigation began prior to the Supreme Court’s judgment in 2014. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Vikram Nath.

The State has the legislative competence under Entry 24 of List II over industries but this is subject to entries 7 and 52 of List I. Under Entry 52 of List I, Parliament has legislative competence over such industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.

 The Supreme Court by a 4-3  majority overruled Azeez Basha. The majority held that merely because an institute is created by a statute does not strip it of minority status. The majority also held that Article 30(1) protects institutes established before the Constitution came into force in 1950. The Court laid down criteria to determine when an institution is a minority institution benefitting from Article 30(1) protection. The majority judgment was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud. Justices  Kant, Datta and Sharma authored separate (partly dissenting) opinions. 

The Constitution Bench (five judges) modified the Common Cause judgment dated 9 March 2018, and simplified the procedure for executing AMDs, such as significantly reducing the role of Judicial Magistrate First Class. The objective was to streamline the process to address practical challenges encountered during the implementation of the directives. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Joseph.

The Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court delivered a split verdict and the case was directed to be placed before a larger bench for further consideration. The Court directed the Union Government frame a National Policy on GM crops in consultation with all stakeholders including representatives from State Governments. Two separate judgments were authored by Justice Nagarathna and Justice Karol.Justice Nagarathna held that the approval granted by the Union Government for environmental release of transgenic mustard DMH-11 should be invalidated, as there was no consideration of the adverse effects of the transgenic crops on human, animal, and plant health. She directed the GEAC to submit a report on whether DMH-11 mustard is a herbicide resistant crop in consultation with all stakeholders, and to make the report public. She further directed the Union Government to ensure that the composition of the GEAC is suitably reformed in accordance with the TEC and Parliamentary Standing Committee reports.Justice Karol held that the question of ban on herbicide resistant crops is a matter of public policy and cannot be invalidated in view of precautionary principle. (This principle stipulates that in case of scientific uncertainty, appropriate actions must be taken to prevent irreversible harm to the environment.) He directed that field trials of DMH-11 shall continue strictly in accordance with the imposed safeguards. He further directed GEAC to conduct independent studies on GM organisms and upload it in its website in a timely manner. The GEAC should consider all environmental factors before granting future approvals and should endeavour to establish specifically designated farms for field testing in collaboration with the Union Government.

Normally, a precedent like Sabhajit Tewary which has stood for a length of time should not be reversed, however erroneous the reasoning if it has stood unquestioned, without its reasoning being "distinguished" out of all recognition by subsequent decisions and if the principles enunciated in the earlier decision can stand consistently and be reconciled with subsequent decisions of this Court, some equally authoritative.

The Supreme Court by a 7-2 majority held that not all private property constitutes ‘material resources of the community’ in Articles 39(b) and (c) to be acquired and redistributed by the State. It overruled the decision of Sanjeev Coke which held that private resources also come under the material resources of the community. The judgment for the majority was written by Chief Justice Candrachud. Justice Nagarathna authored a separate partly dissenting opinion holding that all privately owned resources except for “personal effects” can constitute “material resources of the community” and private property can be “transformed” into community resources through  processes such as nationalisation or acquisition. Justice Dhulia also delivered a dissenting opinion holding that income and wealth inequality are enormous and the broad interpretation of “material resources of the community” adopted in Ranganatha Reddy and Sanjiv Coke is correct. All Nine Judges held that Article 31-C continues to prevent statutes from being struck down for violating Articles 14 and 19 if they give effect to Articles 39(b) and (c), as interpreted in this judgement. The constitutionality of the MHADA will now be decided by a regular bench based on the principles laid down in this case.

The Supreme Court passed a unanimous judgment rejecting the curative petition filed by the Union of India. The Supreme Court held there was no legal principle that justified an increase in compensation. The Supreme Court also refused to increase the settlement amount using its discretionary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The decision of the Court was authored by Justice Kaul.

Power of judicial review vested in Supreme Court and High Court is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution constituting part of its inviolable basic structure-Tribunals created pursuant to Articles 323A and 323B cannot exercise power of judicial review of legislative action to the exclusion of High Courts and Supreme Court-They cannot act as substitutes for High Courts and Supreme Court - However, they are competent to test the vires of statutory provisions except the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal and they may perform a supplemental role in this respect: but their decisions will be subject to High Courts writ jurisdiction under Article 226/227 before a Division Bench-No appeal will directly lie before Supreme Court under Article 136- These directions will apply prospectively - Theory of alternative institutional mechanism, reviewed.

The argument that the provisions of the Penal Code, prescribing death sentence as an alternative penalty for murder have to be tested on the ground of Article 19, appears to proceed on the fallacy that the freedoms guaranteed by Article 19(1) are absolute freedoms and they cannot be curtailed by law imposing reasonable restrictions, which may amount to total prohibition.

The misdirection according to the learned Judge was that the Sessions Judge in his charge did not tell the jury that the sudden confession of the wife to the accused did not in law amount to sudden and grave provocation by the deceased, and instead he left the entire question to be decided by the jury.

Moreover a confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence.